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The Democracy Project is a book about big issues and big words like democracy, 
revolution, capitalism and anarchism. It is also a book about the nitty-gritty of how to 
organise direct action in an anarchist fashion. One of the attractions of the book is that 
its author, David Graeber, understands well the connections, and potential tensions, 
between the two, between the ideals and the micro-level organisational issues of direct 
action. Another plus is that, like other contemporary anarchists such as Todd May, 
Graeber is concerned with the question of organisation. This goes to show that, like 
everybody else, anarchists are concerned with organisational issues, if only in a 
different way. It takes the joke out of the old joke about anarchists: ‘that all sounds very 
well, but now tell me: how do you organise yourselves!?’ 
 The basic thesis of the book, as I have read it, is that, in the Occupy movement, 
we witnessed a prefigurative politics of social and political change. By ‘prefigurative 
politics’, Graeber means ‘the idea that the organizational form that an activist group 
takes should embody the kind of society we wish to create’ (23). The means cannot be 
divorced from the end. The occupiers created spaces of freedom where democratic 
problem solving became possible. This is what anarchism is about, according to 
Graeber: changing the process of making collective decisions, rather than providing a 
blue print for a future society. As he himself puts it: ‘I am less interested in working out 
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what the detailed architecture of what a free society would be like than in creating the 
conditions that would enable us to find out.’ (193) 
David Graeber is a practitioner, and a theorist. He has been engaged in activist 
politics for decades and was very much part of Occupy Wall Street. He uses his 
experiences as an activist for theoretical reflection, placing Occupy in its contemporary 
context (neoliberalism, the society of debt, the alter-globalisation movement, and so on) 
and in its historical context (the tension between republican government and democracy, 
debates within anarchism, and so forth). It is worth highlighting the importance of 
practice in Graeber’s work because not many social theorists – anthropologists like 
Graeber, economists, sociologists, political scientists – are so informed by practice in 
their academic work. Of course, for Graeber it could not be otherwise. Practice comes 
first and must inform theory, not the other way around. This is where I want to raise the 
first of three critical questions. 
In the Acknowledgements, Graber thanks ‘everyone in the movement, who 
taught me everything I know’ (303). I do not want to make too much of a single 
sentence, let alone in the acknowledgements, but it is symptomatic of Graeber’s 
approach, so I shall use it as my starting point.2 What is Graeber telling us with this 
acknowledgement? He seems to be saying that he did not know anything about activism 
and direct action before meeting the people in the Occupy movement and engaging in 
direct action with them. I am not so interested in whether this is true or not – it clearly is 
not: Graeber has engaged in activism in other movements for many years. Nor am I 
simply saying that Graeber already knew about direct action (from reading about it, 
studying it) before being part of Occupy Wall Street. For Graeber, the issue here is 
whether you can actually learn about something by reading about it. To be more precise, 
the question is whether you can have a theory of direct action, or whether you can only 
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learn – and have knowledge about – it by doing it and learning from your failures and 
successes. 
I would say that practice is always a part of it, but your practice is always 
informed by theory. ‘Theory’ may have different names: perspective, worldview, 
preconceptions, prejudices, and so on. We face a tension between our theories and our 
practice. Whether held consciously or not, our theories about the world are challenged 
by our experiences, and vice versa; but our theories also shape our experiences, and vice 
versa. And we face tensions among different experiences and among the different 
theories that we hold. But we never escape theory; there is no immediate relationship to 
experience or to an object of research. That means for me that we must examine and 
acknowledge the ways in which our experience and practice are framed by our theories 
about the world. My wager is that, going into Occupy, Graeber already had some 
knowledge about direct action – some ‘theories’ that shaped what he experienced, what 
he did and what he thought about it. For instance, his assessment of the tactics and 
strategy of the movement is framed by empirical and normative theories of social 
movements, as is evident in the descriptions of the first steps of the movement. 
The second critical question I wish to raise concerns the issue of human essence, 
or human nature. This is an old issue of contention in anarchist thought, and 
traditionally anarchists have relied on a notion of human essence, mostly arguing that 
human beings are inherently good, collaborative, and so on. Many contemporary 
anarchists reject the very notion of a human essence, above all so-called post-anarchists 
inspired by post-structuralism (for instance, Lewis Call, Todd May and Saul Newman). 
David Graeber does not make any explicit mention of human essence in The Democracy 
Project. However, there is something else in the book. First of all, Graeber draws on 
archaeological and anthropological work about historical and contemporary societies to 
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argue that societies organised according to anarchist principles have existed and still 
exist. Among other things, Graeber draws on his own anthropological work in 
Madagascar to support this argument. 
There is another argument about anarchism (and communism, properly 
understood). This is the argument that we are already anarchists (and communists) in 
what we do when we go about our everyday lives. Why? Because we organise our lives 
together in spaces of freedom and equality where there is no threat of violence, and 
where each contributes according to their abilities and enjoys according to their needs: 
‘We are already practicing communism much of the time. We are already anarchists’ 
(295). This does not mean that society is anarchist or communist in its entirety, or that 
we act like this in all aspects of our lives: ‘We are all communists with those we love 
and trust the most; yet no one behaves communistically in all circumstances with 
everyone, or, presumably, ever has or will.’ (294) However, it means that anarchists can 
and must ‘[build] on what we are already doing, expanding the zones of freedom’ to 
ever wider parts of social life (295). 
Graeber uses the archaeological and anthropological research, as well as the 
argument about anarchism and communism, to argue that ‘sociality of any sort always 
assumes a certain baseline communism [and anarchism]’, and that ‘[a]ll societies are 
communistic [and anarchistic] at base’ (294). While Graeber avoids saying anything 
about human essence, the question is whether he assumes that human beings are (at 
base) everywhere and at every time the same. In his description of human society, there 
seems to be a sort of default – collaboration, consensus, equality, freedom, democracy, 
anarchism, communism, and so forth – which is taken as natural rather than something 
to be instituted and institutionalised, and where the opposite is seen as a deviation. This 
is just the crux of the matter for anarchists: if freedom and equality are not natural, they 
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must be institutionalised, and can only exist as such. In that case, norms and limits are 
necessary for freedom, and then it is not a matter of freedom or not, but a matter of 
what, and whose, freedom one institutionalises in some mixture of freedom and 
unfreedom. I am not saying that Graeber could not subscribe to such a view of freedom 
and equality, but it would not sit well with the view that freedom and equality are the 
default for social relations. 
The third critical question is related to the issue of freedom and to the issue of 
organisation. For Graeber, anarchism is about the creation of spaces of freedom where 
people can organise themselves without the threat of violence. Such spaces are 
egalitarian and horizontal rather than vertical. They are characterised by consensus 
decision making although this does not mean that all decisions are made by unanimity, 
but concerns the process of giving everybody a voice. Graeber is a small a anarchist; he 
is looking for ways to pursue democratic change, rather than presenting us with an 
image of what a future society will look like: ‘I like to call myself a “small-a” anarchist. 
I’m less interested in figuring out what sort of anarchist I am than in working in broad 
coalitions that operate in accord with anarchist principles’ (192). He has no problem 
with alliances with non-anarchist groups as long as those alliances do not interfere with 
the horizontality of the movement: ‘“small-a” anarchists such a s myself – that is, the 
sort willing to work in broad coalitions as long as they work on horizontal principles’ 
(89). 
Against this background, I would like to raise the following question. The first 
concerns the way we think about freedom, whether the freedom of individuals or the 
autonomy of the spaces of freedom, especially in relation to the state.3 I read The 
Democracy Project as suggesting that freedom should be understood in terms of the 
absence of the threat of violence, whether explicit or implicit, and that it is this that 
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makes possible people’s democratic self-organisation. My question is to what extent we 
can think this freedom and autonomy in these terms of negative freedom or freedom 
from the threat of violence. I do not think that anarchists in general, or Graeber in 
particular, need to fall back on a negative conception of freedom, but there seems to be 
a risk of doing so. If, instead, we consider freedom and autonomy as always embedded 
in relations, which are always at once horizontal and vertical, then my identity and 
freedom, and the autonomy of the people or of a group of individuals, always depend on 
a relation to something beyond my, or our, control. Although a different way of 
approaching freedom and autonomy, the end result may not be that different: David 
Graeber uses much of The Democracy Project to analyse the relations among 
individuals and groups within the movement and the relations of the movement to other 
groups and institutions. This is one of the strengths of the book.  
There is a lot in The Democracy Project with which I agree, but I have tried to 
accentuate some differences in the form of critical questions that are precisely that: 








                                               
1 Lasse Thomassen is Senior Lecturer in the School of Politics & International Relations 
at Queen Mary, University of London. His research focuses on radical democracy, 
deconstruction, Habermas and identity politics, and he is currently working on a book 
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project entitled The Politics of Identity and Inclusion. His books include the co-edited 
volume Radical Democracy: Politics between Abundance and Lack (Manchester 
University Press, 2005). 
2 See also David Graber, Fragments of an Anarchist Anthropology (Chicago: Prickly 
Paradigm Press, 2004). 
3 Let me be clear: Graeber’s account of anarchism and the Occupy movement is by no 
ways naive – one of the typical criticisms of anarchism. For instance, he has a very 
interesting and helpful discussion of the relationship between movements such as 
Occupy and state institutions and other groups in chapter 4. 
